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 THE CONDITIONS FOR ETHICAL APPLICATION OF RESTRAINTS 
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Despite the lack of evidence for their effectiveness, the use of physical restraints for patients is 
widespread. The best ethical justification for restraining patients is that it prevents them from 
harming themselves. We argue that even if the empirical evidence supported their effectiveness 
in achieving this aim, their use would nevertheless be unethical, so long as well known 
exceptions to informed consent fail to apply. Specifically, we argue that ethically justifiable 
restraint use demands certain necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions are that the 
physician obtain informed consent for their application, that their application be medically 
appropriate, and that restraints be the least liberty-restricting way of achieving the intended 
benefit. It is a further question whether their application is ever medically appropriate, given the 
dearth of evidence for their effectiveness. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Restricting a person’s physical movement is a significant infringement upon a person’s 
liberty. Physically restraining patients therefore puts healthcare providers at risk of committing a 
serious moral wrong by infringing on a patient’s liberty to move his or her body. Yet not all 
restraints are unethical. In this paper we detail the conditions for the ethical use of physical 
restraints in medicine. While most research on the use of physical restraints has focused on 
prevalence, outcomes, and alternatives, very little of this research has provided guidance on the 
conditions under which physically restraining a patient is ethical. Others have argued that the 
principles of biomedical ethics sometimes permit the use of restraints and other times prohibit 
their use; and some have offered similar recommendations.1,2 But this previous research, and to 
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our knowledge any other research, fails to thoroughly defend the conditions under which 
restraints are permissible. What follows fills that gap. 
 In the first section we briefly discuss research on the prevalence of and reasons for the 
use of restraints. This research indicates widespread use of physical restraints and for a diverse 
range of reasons and under a diverse range of conditions. In the second section we begin to 
evaluate the reasons for using restraints on patients. In the subsequent sections we consider the 
conditions for permissible liberty restrictions, the outcomes of physically restraining patients, 
and available alternatives to physical restraints. We conclude that in the absence of informed 
consent from the patient or their surrogate, the use of physical restraints is an impermissible 
violation of the patient’s liberty. This conclusion rests on the idea that the movement of one’s 
body, specifically, one’s arms—which restraints are intended to prevent—is a basic liberty, the 
restriction of which cannot be justified by typical exceptions to obtaining informed consent. 
 
PREVALENCE 
 
The use of restraints in hospitals is widespread, especially in ICUs. For example, one 
study found that 82% of ICUs in France had more than 50% of their mechanically ventilated 
patients in physical restraints.3 But France is not unique. In Europe 33% of all ICU patients are 
restrained.4 In the Netherlands 23% of all ICU patients are restrained.5 And in South Africa 
nearly half (48%) of all ICU patients are restrained.6  
In the United States, 50 of every 1000 patient days are spent physically restrained.7 This 
amounts to around 27,000 patients restrained daily. Unsurprisingly, 56% of these are in ICUs. In 
medical intensive care units 179 of every 1000 patient days are spent in restraints, while in 
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surgical intensive care units and neuro-intensive care units restraints are even more prevalent 
(220 days and 268 days, respectively). While restraints are widely used in some places, some 
nations, like the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries, prohibit the use of restraints. 
Frequent restraint use occurs despite universal agreement among practice standards, professional 
bodies, and regulatory bodies that restraints should be used sparingly and reassessed regularly.8–
15  
 
REASONS 
 
 Reasons for restraining patients vary. But the most common reason, and the reason that 
most justifies the use of restraints, is that restraints purportedly prevent the patient from 
removing a device, such as an endotracheal tube, which would cause the patient harm. Often 
restraints are applied to patients who are agitated, restless, or delirious. But they are also applied 
as a precautionary measure. For example, some ICUs have a practice that all intubated patients 
be physically restrained, unless they are sufficiently chemically restrained.  
 Another reason for restraints is staff safety. For instance, agitated patients are a potential 
threat to the safety of the nursing staff, and restraining patients may mitigate this threat. A third 
reason for physical restraints is that restraining patients is convenient for the staff.16–19 In some 
cases, this restriction of liberty is convenient to facilities incapable or unwilling to staff medical 
units appropriately. In other cases, the patient rooms are not convenient to the location of the 
nurses’ station to allow for appropriate, less restrictive supervision of intubated patients.  
 The case that a patient ought to be restrained rests on the premises that (a) restraints 
prevent device removal and (b) that the removal of a device constitutes a harm to the patient. As 
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we argue below, neither of these premises are adequately supported. More generally, however, 
the argument that a patient ought to be restrained is a consequentialist argument: the ends (harms 
associated with patient-removal of devices) justify the means (the restriction of a basic liberty). 
But the act of applying restraints is ethical only if the ends are actually achieved and there are no 
overwhelming costs associated with the means.  
 
EXCEPTIONS TO INFORMED CONSENT 
 
 The freedom to control one’s body is a basic liberty. It’s difficult to overstate the 
importance of the question: Under what circumstances is it permissible for anyone (i.e., 
healthcare providers, governments, law enforcement, etc.) to restrict a person’s basic liberty of 
uninhibited physical movement? And does restraining patients violate their autonomy? Answers 
to these questions help to define the boundaries of permissibly restraining patients. 
 We seek to protect a patient’s autonomy because to protect their autonomy is to respect 
them as a person. Medicine expresses this value of autonomy by emphasizing shared decision-
making between physician and patient and through thorough processes of informed consent. 
Restraints, like any treatment, violate a person’s autonomy unless the patient or their surrogate 
has provided informed consent or the requirement for informed consent is excepted. 
 There are several well known exceptions to the requirement for obtaining informed 
consent. One is that informed consent is not necessary for treatment of medical emergencies. But 
restrained patients are not typically in need of emergent treatment—they’re usually applied after 
the emergency has passed. The emergency exception also justifies the compelled treatment of 
people who are an emergent threat to themselves or others. If a person is a threat to themselves 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 5 
or others, but that threat is distant, then it is impermissible to compel treatment (indeed, we are 
all a distant threat to ourselves or others). 
 
 
It is also unnecessary to obtain informed consent from patients who have waived this 
requirement for themselves. Restrained patients may have explicitly waived this right, or they 
may not. If they have, then consent for physical restraints is unnecessary. For example, some 
patients write advance directives for mental health. In these the patient may explicitly waive the 
right to consent (or refuse) various treatments. In these cases, obtaining consent for treatments in 
the advance directive is unnecessary.  
 A third exception is therapeutic privilege. Therapeutic privilege is invoked when 
obtaining informed consent is medically contraindicated—the informed consent process would 
harm the patient. While it’s true that restraints are applied to prevent harm, and that obtaining 
informed consent may cause the patient or their surrogate to refuse the application of the 
restraints, therapeutic privilege cannot exempt a physician from obtaining informed consent. 
Therapeutic privilege is justifiably invoked only when the process of obtaining informed consent 
harms the patient, not when obtaining informed consent merely makes the patient or their 
surrogate less likely to receive recommended treatment.  
We argue elsewhere for a fourth exception: informed consent is unnecessary when 
obtaining it would undermine the achievement of something objectively valuable.20 But this 
exception offers no harbor for those wanting to apply restraints without informed consent, as 
obtaining informed consent for restraints would not undermine the achievement of something 
objectively valuable. 
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 The standard exceptions to the requirement for obtaining informed consent don’t exempt 
physicians from obtaining informed consent for restraints. Although all treatments require a 
patient’s consent, sometimes this consent can be presumed. For example, a physician treating a 
patient in an ICU may presume consent for standard treatments such as dosage or medication 
changes, or for treatments implied by other treatments that the patient has consented to. Might 
consent for restraints be presumed? 
 
RESTRICTING BASIC LIBERTIES 
 
 The liberty to move one’s body in the way one wants is a basic liberty. Often discussions 
of which liberties are basic will wave at things like liberty of thought, association, and speech. 
But one could equally hold that moving one’s body, in this case the liberty to move one’s arms, 
is a basic liberty. We think this claim is so obvious it doesn’t need defense. But for those wanting 
such a defense, Phillip Pettit argues that a liberty is basic when it is required for living the life of 
a free person.21 Moving one’s functioning arms seems to count as required for living the life of a 
free person. Though obviously humans flourish without arms, when arms function as they should 
a person cannot be considered free if the movement of their arms is physically restricted. A 
person with fully functioning arms living a life with those arms chained is not a free person. 
Provided that one’s arm movements don’t encroach on another person’s liberties, the liberty to 
move one’s arms in the way one wants is a basic liberty.  
There are circumstances in which it is ethically and legally permissible to restrict a 
person’s basic liberties. These circumstances include when the state punishes one for crimes 
committed. Prisoners have some of their basic liberties revoked (but they retain others). 
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Restricting a person’s basic liberties may also be permissible when the person retaining that 
liberty represents a preventable threat to another person or him or herself, such as when one 
expresses suicidal or homicidal ideation, or even when laws compel behavior, such as in a 
person’s compulsion to get vaccinated or wear a seatbelt. In these cases, the threat of potential 
harm (and the likelihood of potential benefit) justifies the liberty restriction. However, even in 
the case of involuntary commitment the restriction of basic liberties proceeds only under 
rigorous regulatory protections. A third instance of permissible restriction of basic liberties is 
when the person whose liberties are being restricted explicitly consents to their restriction. 
 The liberty to move one’s arms is sufficiently important that reasonable people could find 
that treatment requiring its restriction conflicts with their own values. Reasonable people may 
think that retaining basic liberties is more valuable than attempting to improve their own health. 
The decision to restrict one’s liberty is not something about which physicians know more. Basic 
liberty restriction is not in the medical school curriculum, unlike which antibiotic is better for the 
detected bacteria or which analgesic is compatible with patient susceptibility, which are medical 
decisions consent for which can be presumed. An unconscious ICU patient has little say in 
whether it is appropriate to discontinue vancomycin, but they (along with the state) have the final 
say in whether it is appropriate to restrict their basic liberties.  
Consent can be permissibly presumed only for treatments that a reasonable person 
wouldn’t refuse. A person may reasonably refuse restraints at the cost of experiencing some 
other harm. Indeed, frequently patients who may recover medically from some condition choose 
instead to die, because losing their liberty is so costly to them. Further, seeking treatment does 
not imply consent to all medically necessary treatments. There is no such thing as an ethical 
general consent to all treatment upon presentation to a hospital. A patient presenting to the 
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hospital for unremitting back pain unknowingly caused by end-stage bone cancer doesn’t thereby 
consent to multiple rounds of chemotherapy. A person seeking medical treatment is unlikely to 
know what the burdens of treatment are until the physician informs them. Once they find out, 
they may find that the burdens of treatment outweigh the benefits and decide to refuse the 
recommended treatment. There is no liberty more basic to medicine than the liberty a competent 
and capable patient has to refuse recommended treatments. Our point is simply that a reasonable 
person may find that the restriction of their basic liberties diminishes their well being so 
significantly that the liberty restriction represents a burden too great to bear. Physicians cannot 
presume consent for restraints. 
 Relatedly, one might claim that the restriction of one’s basic liberty to move one’s arms 
is permissible on the grounds that it is necessary for the prevention of harm to oneself or others. 
First, however, typically liberty restrictions proceed through the legal system with due process 
protections; the application of restraints does not. Second, the conclusion requires the premises 
that the person’s retaining the liberty is likely to result in harm, and that this harm is prevented 
by the use of restraints. Given the results of empirical research, we ought to be skeptical of both 
of these premises. 
 
OUTCOMES 
 
 Restraints are typically applied to prevent the patient from removing a device and causing 
harm to themselves. The premise that restraints prevent device removal is questionable. The 
research on the benefits and burdens of restraints is, at best, equivocal.19,22–24 Studies indicate 
that physical restraints often fail to prevent device self-removal and instead that they may 
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contribute to increased rates of self-removal.25–33 Conversely, evidence indicates that the harms 
associated with self-removal are exaggerated. Others have highlighted an extensive number of 
harms from physical restraints, including physical harm to patient up to and including death, as 
well as patient, family, and nursing psychological distress.31,34–50 Moreover, in countries with 
minimal restraint use, simple interventions such as staff educational and environmental changes 
have been found to decrease restraint use without evidence in increased patient or staff risk.25,56-
62   
The evidence casts doubt upon the position that restraining patients prevents device 
removal and the associated harm. It can’t be taken for granted that restraints prevent device 
removal—to claim that it does requires evidence, and the proponent of using restraints bears this 
burden of proof. 
 The argument that a patient ought to be restrained rests on the premises that that the 
person’s retaining the liberty is likely to result in harm, and that this harm is prevented by the use 
of restraints. But these premises cannot be assumed—they must be supported with evidence. We 
are not claiming that restraints don’t prevent device removal or that harm doesn’t result from 
device removal. We are claiming that the evidence warrants skepticism of these premises 
sufficient to shift the burden of proof. 
 
PERMISSIBLE RESTRAINTS 
 
 The evidence does not support the claim that restraints prevent patients from harming 
themselves. But there are further costs associated with their use. Not only does being restrained 
increase the likelihood of self-extubation, restrained patients are also more likely to experience 
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distress, anxiety, nightmares, PTSD, perception of unethical behavior, and re-traumatization. For 
the patient, restraints are often perceived as traumatic.58–60 Patients are not the only people who 
may experience negative outcomes from restraints; nurses often feel guilt or regret for the 
application of restraints.61 
The circumstances in which it is permissible to restrict a person’s basic liberties do not 
obtain in the case of applying restraints to patients. And the circumstances in which they are 
usually applied are not exempt from the requirement of obtaining informed consent. Thus, 
restraints for which informed consent has not been obtained unjustifiably restrict a patient’s basic 
liberties and violate the patient’s autonomy. These are the greatest costs of using restraints. 
There are, however, circumstances in which the application of restraints is ethically 
permissible. Although the application of restraints without informed consent cannot be justified 
by prevention of harm to the patient, restraints may be permissible if the patient or the patient’s 
surrogate decision maker consent to their application. This is a necessary condition, not a 
sufficient one.  
The restraints must also be medically appropriate. The evidence demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness of restraints calls into doubt the medical appropriateness of restraints. But it’s 
possible that a physician may make a judgment that restraints are medically appropriate. Even if 
the physician makes such a judgment and the patient or their surrogate offers informed consent 
for their application, they may nevertheless be unethical.  
If a treatment is medically appropriate, then the benefits of that treatment for the patient 
are proportional to the burdens. If they are disproportionate, then the treatment is not medically 
appropriate. Having one’s liberty restricted is a great burden regardless of whether one consents 
and whether one values their own liberty. Having to bear this burden may threaten the 
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proportionality, depending on the expected benefit of being restrained. If there are other ways of 
achieving the intended benefit (e.g., preventing self-extubation), then the burden of restraints is 
an unnecessary burden. And treatments that require patients to bear unnecessary burdens are not 
medically appropriate. If the same aim can be achieved with a different intervention, such as 
closer monitoring of the patient, that doesn’t require the patient to bear such great burdens of 
liberty restriction, then that’s the treatment that achieves the best proportion of benefits to 
burdens. Indeed, requiring a patient to bear unnecessary burdens may itself constitute harm. 
Thus, for restraints to be ethical they must be the least liberty-restricting means of achieving that 
aim. 
These are the severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the ethical 
application of restraints: the patient or surrogate must provide informed consent; the restraints 
must be medically appropriate; and the restraints must be the least liberty-restricting means of 
achieving the intended aim. These conditions allow for the ethical use of restraints in some cases, 
though the challenge to the physician will be to demonstrate that they are medically appropriate. 
But the conditions also prohibit the use of restraints simply for the purposes of staff convenience. 
Suppose that a nurse applies restraints because the patient cannot be closely monitored due to the 
fact that hospital will not financially support more nurses in the unit. In this case, there are other 
ways of preventing device removal, such as by placing a sitter in the room, which is less liberty-
restricting. Thus, the use of restraints to prevent device removal is ethically unjustifiable. 
Consider, for example, how these conditions would apply to common clinical situations. 
Suppose that an intubated patient whose life is being sustained by additional treatments begins 
pulling at the tubes and lines. At first, unless restraints are the least restrictive option and the 
patient has provided informed consent, they are ethically impermissible, even if they are 
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medically appropriate. However, if other, less liberty-restricting options of preventing the self-
removal of life-sustaining devices fail, then restraints may become the least liberty restricting 
option. That they are the least restrictive means of preventing self-removal of devices does not 
obviate consent from the patient or surrogate. If consent for the treatment was not obtained 
beforehand (e.g., prior to a surgery), then it must be obtained prior to the application of 
restraints. To claim that consent is not required for their application in this case, one must 
provide reasons to think that the application of restraints is excepted from the requirement of 
informed consent. One possibility is that in such a case the emergency exception would apply. 
But if it does not, and if other exceptions don’t apply, then it is unethical to apply restraints, even 
if the patient continues to remove devices, just as it would be unethical to compel any other 
treatment for which a patient or surrogate has not consented. 
Consider a situation in which a patient is on 100% oxygen, proned on 20 PEEP, and will 
likely die if he pulls his endotracheal tube out. There are situations in which it may be ethically 
permissible to restrain the patient even if the patient or his surrogate has not consented to their 
application. These are situations in which the restraints are not only medically appropriate but 
also the least liberty-restricting means of preventing his death from self-extubation. If the 
restraints are emergently needed, then the satisfaction of these two conditions is sufficient for 
their ethical application, as there is no requirement for informed consent. That is, in situations in 
which restraints are emergently needed to save life or limb, consent for their application is not 
necessary. Satisfaction of the other two conditions is sufficient.  
Suppose next that a patient has provided informed consent for cardiac catheterization but 
during the procedure becomes delirious and tries to grab the catheter. Such a patient is at risk of 
harming himself. The emergency exception may obviate informed consent for restraints in this 
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case, but it would have been better to include the possibility of restraints in the original informed 
consent. Basic liberty restriction is an adverse event, as it can significantly diminish a patient’s 
well being. If it is a risk of a procedure, as it would be in this case, then it ought to be included in 
the informed consent for the cardiac catheterization. For example, the informed consent ought to 
have included discussion of the fact that the patient may be at risk of delirium and that, if 
delirious, the patient may be restrained (the other two conditions would still have to also be 
satisfied). That it has been ignored in this process does not license physicians to ignore it 
altogether, in the absence of some exception to the requirement of informed consent. 
Finally consider a case in which a patient’s self-extubation is a nuisance, but not life-
threatening. In this case, the three conditions for ethical application of restraints apply: the 
patient or surrogate must provide informed consent; they must be medically appropriate; and 
they must be the least liberty-restricting means of achieving the intention at which they are 
aimed. 
Often patients in an ICU are unable to offer informed consent because they lack 
decisional capacity and no other family member or friend or guardian is available to make 
medical decisions on the patient’s behalf. Though there are often policies, procedures, and laws 
that assist in identifying surrogates, this often takes long periods of time, in some cases weeks. In 
the interim, the responsibility of medical decision making falls to the physician until another 
surrogate decision maker can be identified. In the likely event that the physician is unfamiliar 
with the patient’s values and beliefs, he or she ought to make medical decisions according to the 
patient’s best interests. But this standard of surrogate decision making doesn’t warrant the 
unconsented application of restraints, for in the absence of knowledge of the patient’s values and 
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beliefs a physician can’t assume that a patient’s interests are best served by the promotion of 
their health rather than their retention of basic liberties.  
 There are likely many who would be uncomfortable with the conclusion that it is wrong 
to restrain a patient without their consent, especially given the prevalence of the practice. They 
might point to their own personal experience in which a person desperately trying to remove a 
breathing tube must be restrained. The natural objection such people might make is to the 
empirical evidence used above. Such a person might point out that the evidence that restraints 
don’t prevent harm is inconclusive or, even after their own analysis of the studies, assert that the 
designs are flawed or that they don’t support the inferences we say they support.  
 First, the fact that a person is trying to remove a medical device is evidence that, all 
things considered, the person wants that device removed, if that patient has decisional capacity. 
To assume that such attempts require restraints to prevent device removal is to assume that the 
patient is irrational, which is sometimes a false assumption. Second, we are not claiming that the 
empirical evidence refutes the claim that restraints prevent harm. We are saying it is compelling 
enough to shift the burden onto the proponent of using unconsented restraints. She must show 
that they do prevent harm. Furthermore, the fact that the empirical evidence doesn’t support the 
use of restraints greases the wheels of our argument; it doesn’t turn them. What turns the wheels 
is the fact that restraints are typically used in situations to which the standard exceptions to 
informed consent don’t apply. And because the liberty to move one’s arms is a basic liberty, one 
cannot presume consent to restrict it. Third, even if restraints did prevent harm, that doesn’t 
excuse their unconsented use. We routinely allow people to make decisions that result in their 
own harm. If we didn’t, hospitals wouldn’t allow patients to leave the hospital against medical 
advice or refuse life-prolonging treatment.  
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 15 
 One might also object to the idea that moving one’s arms is a basic liberty, and because it 
is not a basic liberty it is permissible to presume consent to restrict it. But this objection misses 
the mark. We haven’t argued for the claim that only restriction of basic liberties requires 
informed consent. We hold that moving one’s arms is a basic liberty and that restriction of any 
basic liberty requires informed consent, unless there is no such requirement, such as in 
emergencies or when the state has revoked the right to informed consent. This is compatible with 
the requirement that the restriction of non-basic liberties also be permissible only after obtaining 
informed consent. Indeed, it seems absurd to hold that presumed consent is sufficient for the 
restriction of non-basic liberties. If there are behaviors that can be permissibly limited simply at 
the will of others (the physician’s presumption of consent), then those behaviors are not liberties 
at all. If physicians could presume consent for restriction of non-basic liberties, then the moment 
one establishes a physician-patient relationship the scope of one’s liberties has narrowed 
significantly. Physicians are not empowered to restrict liberties, unless the state explicitly 
permits them to do so. 
 
ALTERNATIVES   
 
 Using restraints on patients without obtaining informed consent is not ethically 
permissible, unless the standard exceptions to informed consent apply. But that doesn’t mean 
that prevention of the purported harm is impossible. There are alternatives which can reduce the 
rate of unplanned extubation.62–65 These include mitts, efforts to minimize delirium (e.g., by 
maintaining the patient’s appropriate sleep cycle), employing a sitter in the room with the 
patient, increasing the presence of family or other surrogate decision makers, using alarms on the 
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beds or music in the room, increasing the number of nurses on the unit, and more frequently 
visiting the bedside in the evening and overnight. I 
 Physical restraints are not the only medical means of attempting to prevent device 
removal. Often chemical restraints are administered to prevent device removal. While the 
conditions for the permissibility of chemical restraints may be the same as those of the 
permissibility of physical restraints, we don’t argue for this position here. Whether the conditions 
are the same hinges on whether chemical restraints restrict a person’s liberty of thought, and 
whether such liberties are basic liberties. We don’t offer an argument for these positions here, 
but recognize that our account may plausibly extend to chemical restraints. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The use of unconsented physical restraints on patients is not ethically permissible. They 
represent an impermissible restriction of a basic liberty. Even if they achieved their purported 
benefit— and there is little evidence that they do—their use still wouldn’t be justified. But recall 
that there are other reasons, including safety to the staff, and staff convenience. Maintaining 
safety of the staff may justify short-term restraints (e.g., while sticking the patient with a needle 
or subduing a combative or violent patient). If a patient represents a long-term or permanent 
potential threat to the safety of the staff, then it is permissible to restrict the patient’s basic 
liberties, but this ought to also proceed through a legal process designed to protect due process. 
For situations in which the above conditions are not satisfied, but nurses or physicians are 
nevertheless considering applying restraints, it is important that the team reflect on not only what 
might be gained by restraining a patient, but also what might be lost. More generally, given that 
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nurses frequently request restraints but physicians order them and that the potential for ethical 
conflict is so great, it is important that interested parties engage in interprofessional dialogue 
regarding the conditions for the use of restraints. Ethics committees or hospital administrators 
may be in the best position to foster this dialogue. 
What is most morally objectionable is to restrain patients for staff convenience. If a unit 
or facility cannot promote a patient’s health without simultaneously violating their basic 
liberties, then it has no business caring for the sick. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1.  Moss RJ, Puma J La. The Ethics of Mechanical Restraints. Hastings Cent Rep. 
1991;21(1):22. doi:10.2307/3563342. 
2.  Gastmans C, Milisen K. Use of physical restraint in nursing homes: clinical-ethical 
considerations. J Med Ethics. 2006;32(3):148-152. doi:10.1136/jme.2005.012708. 
3.  De Jonghe B, Constantin J-M, Chanques G, et al. Physical restraint in mechanically 
ventilated ICU patients: a survey of French practice. Intensive Care Med. 2013;39(1):31-
37. doi:10.1007/s00134-012-2715-9. 
4.  Benbenbishty J, Adam S, Endacott R. Physical restraint use in intensive care units across 
Europe: The PRICE study. Intensive Crit Care Nurs. 2018;26(5):241-245. 
doi:10.1016/j.iccn.2010.08.003. 
5.  van der Kooi AW, Peelen LM, Raijmakers RJ, et al. Use of Physical Restraints in Dutch 
Intensive Care Units: A Prospective Multicenter Study. Am J Crit Care . 2015;24(6):488-
495. doi:10.4037/ajcc2015348. 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 18 
6.  Langley G, Schmollgruber S, Egan A. Restraints in intensive care units-A mixed method 
study. Intensive Crit Care Nurs. 2011;27(2):67-75. doi:10.1016/j.iccn.2010.12.001. 
7.  Mion LC. Physical restraint in critical care settings: will they go away? Geriatr Nurs. 
2008;29(6):421-423. doi:10.1016/j.gerinurse.2008.09.006. 
8.  Maccioli GA, Dorman T, Brown BR, et al. Clinical practice guidelines for the 
maintenance of patient physical safety in the intensive care unit: Use of restraining 
therapies - American College of Critical Care Medicine Task Force 2001-2002. Crit Care 
Med. 2003;31(11):2665-2676. doi:10.1097/01.CCM.0000095463.72353.AD. 
9.  Park  PhD, RN M, Tang  PhD, RN JH-C. Evidence-Based Guideline: Changing the 
Practice of Physical Restraint Use in Acute Care. J Gerontol Nurs. 2007;33(2):9-16. 
http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/204152
014?accountid=14771%5Cnhttp://bf4dv7zn3u.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.
88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Ahealthcompletealumnishell&rf. 
10.  Bray K, Hill K, Robson W, et al. British Association of Critical Care Nurses position 
statement on the use of restraint in adult critical care units. Nurs Crit Care. 2004;9(5):199-
212. doi:10.1111/j.1362-1017.2004.00074.x. 
11.  Lach HW. Changing the Practice of Physical Restraint Use in Acute Care. J Gerontol 
Nurs. 2016;42(2):17-26. doi:10.3928/00989134-20160113-04. 
12.  Reduction of Patient Restraint and Seclusion in Health Care Settings Status: Revised 
Position Statement.; 2012. 
https://www.nursingworld.org/~4af287/globalassets/docs/ana/ethics/ps_reduction-of-
patient-restraint-and-seclusion-in-health-care-settings.pdf. Accessed August 20, 2018. 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 19 
13.  American Academy of Nursing Choosing Wisely. www.AANnet.org. Accessed August 20, 
2018. 
14.  Health C for D and R. Bed Rail Safety - Recommendations for Health Care Providers 
about Bed Rails. 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/HomeHealthandCo
nsumer/ConsumerProducts/BedRailSafety/ucm362848.htm. Accessed August 20, 2018. 
15.  CMS Financial Report. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/CFOReport/Downloads/2009_CMS_Financial_Report.pdf. Accessed August 20, 
2018. 
16.  Choi E, Song M. Physical restraint use in a Korean ICU. J Clin Nurs. 2003;12(5):651-659. 
17.  Langley G, Schmollgruber S, Egan A. Restraints in intensive care units—a mixed method 
study. Intensive Crit Care Nurs. 2011;27(2):67-75. 
18.  Jiang H, Li C, Gu Y, He Y. Nurses’ perceptions and practice of physical restraint in 
China. Nurs Ethics. 2015;22(6):652-660. doi:10.1177/0969733014557118. 
19.  Evans D, Wood J, Lambert L. A review of physical restraint minimization in the acute and 
residential care settings. J Adv Nurs. 2002;40(6):616-625. doi:10.1046/j.1365-
2648.2002.02422.x. 
20.  Author. 
21.  Pettit P. The Basic Liberties. In: Kramer MH, ed. The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, 
Political, and Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press; 2008. 
22.  Rose L, Dale C, Smith OM, et al. A mixed-methods systematic review protocol to 
examine the use of physical restraint with critically ill adults and strategies for minimizing 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 20 
their use. Syst Rev. 2016;5(1):1-8. doi:10.1186/s13643-016-0372-8. 
23.  Hofsø K, Coyer FM. Part 1. Chemical and physical restraints in the management of 
mechanically ventilated patients in the ICU: contributing factors. Intensive Crit Care 
Nurs. 2007;23(5):249-255. 
24.  Hofsø K, Coyer FM. Part 2. Chemical and physical restraints in the management of 
mechanically ventilated patients in the ICU: a patient perspective. Intensive Crit Care 
Nurs. 2007;23(6):316-322. 
25.  Chang L-Y, Wang K-WK, Chao Y-F. Influence of physical restraint on unplanned 
extubation of adult intensive care patients: a case-control study. Am J Crit Care. 
2008;17(5):408-15; quiz 416. 
26.  Birkett KM, Southerland KA, Leslie GD. Reporting unplanned extubation. Intensive Crit 
care Nurs. 2005;21(2):65-75. doi:10.1016/j.iccn.2004.07.012. 
27.  Perren A, Corbella D, Iapichino E, et al. Physical restraint in the ICU: does it prevent 
device removal? Minerva Anestesiol. 2015;81(10):1086-1095. 
28.  da Silva PSL, Fonseca MCM. Unplanned Endotracheal Extubations in the Intensive Care 
Unit. Anesth Analg. 2012;114(5):1003-1014. doi:10.1213/ANE.0b013e31824b0296. 
29.  Mion LC, Minnick AF, Leipzig RM, Catrambone CD, Johnson ME. Patient-initiated 
device removal in intensive care units: A national prevalence study. Crit Care Med. 
2007;35(12):2714-2720. doi:10.1097/01.CCM.0000291651.12767.52. 
30.  Chuang ML, Lee CY, Chen YF, Huang SF, Lin IF. Revisiting unplanned endotracheal 
extubation and disease severity in intensive care units. PLoS One. 2015;10(10):1-10. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139864. 
31.  Rose L, Burry L, Mallick R, et al. Prevalence, risk factors, and outcomes associated with 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 21 
physical restraint use in mechanically ventilated adults. J Crit Care. 2016;31(1):31-35. 
doi:10.1016/j.jcrc.2015.09.011. 
32.  Chang L-C, Liu P-F, Huang Y-L, Yang S-S, Chang W-Y. Risk factors associated with 
unplanned endotracheal self-extubation of hospitalized intubated patients: a 3-year 
retrospective case-control study. Appl Nurs Res. 2011;24(3):188-192. 
doi:10.1016/J.APNR.2009.09.002. 
33.  Curry K, Cobb S, Kutash M, Diggs C. Characteristics associated with unplanned 
extubations in a surgical intensive care unit. Am J Crit Care. 2008;17(1):45-51; quiz 52. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18158389. Accessed April 10, 2018. 
34.  Kang J, Lee E-N, Park EY, Lee Y, Lee MM. Emotional Response of ICU PatientsFamily 
toward Physical Restraints. Korean J Adult Nurs. 2013;25(2):148-156. 
35.  Yamamoto M, Aso Y. Placing physical restraints on older people with dementia. Nurs 
Ethics. 2009;16(2):192-202. doi:10.1177/0969733008100079. 
36.  Guenette M, Burry L, Cheung A, et al. Psychotropic drug use in physically restrained, 
critically ill adults receiving mechanical ventilation. Am J Crit Care. 2017;26(5):380-387. 
37.  Möhler R, Meyer G. Attitudes of nurses towards the use of physical restraints in geriatric 
care: A systematic review of qualitative and quantitative studies. Int J Nurs Stud. 
2014;51(2 PG-274-288):274-288. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2013.10.004. 
38.  McCabe DE, Alvarez CD, McNulty SR, Fitzpatrick JJ. Perceptions of Physical Restraints 
Use in the Elderly Among Registered Nurses and Nurse Assistants in a Single Acute Care 
Hospital. Geriatr Nurs (Minneap). 2011;32(1):39-45. 
doi:10.1016/j.gerinurse.2010.10.010. 
39.  Freeman S, Hallett C, McHugh G. Physical restraint: experiences, attitudes and opinions 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 22 
of adult intensive care unit nurses. Nurs Crit Care. 2016;21(2):78-87. 
doi:10.1111/nicc.12197. 
40.  Titler MG, Shever LL, Kanak MF, Picone DM, Qin R. Factors Associated With Falls 
During Hospitalization in an Older Adult Population. Res Theory Nurs Pract. 
2011;25(2):127-152. doi:10.1891/1541-6577.25.2.127. 
41.  Bower FL, McCullough CS, Timmons ME. A Synthesis of What We Know About the 
Use of Physical Restraints and Seclusion with Patients in Psychiatric and Acute Care 
Settings: 2003 Update. Worldviews Evidence-based Nurs Present Arch Online J Knowl 
Synth Nurs. 2004;E10(1):1-29. doi:10.1111/j.1524-475X.2003.00001.x. 
42.  Yamamoto M, Izumi K, Usui K. Dilemmas facing Japanese nurses regarding the physical 
restraint of elderly patients. Japan J Nurs Sci. 2006;3(1):43-50. doi:10.1111/j.1742-
7924.2006.00056.x. 
43.  Berzlanovich AM, Schöpfer J, Keil W. Todesfälle bei gurtfixierungen. Dtsch Arztebl Int. 
2012;109(3):27-32. doi:10.3238/arztebl.2012.0027. 
44.  Hatchett C, Langley G, Schmollgruber S. Psychological sequelae following ICU 
admission at a level 1 academic South African hospital. South African J Crit Care. 
2010;26:52-58. 
http://ovidsp.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&D=eme
d10&AN=2012510856%3C348.%5Cn%3E. 
45.  Demir A. Nurses’ Use of Physical Restraints in Four Turkish Hospitals. J Nurs Scholarsh. 
2007;39(1):38-45. doi:10.1111/j.1547-5069.2007.00141.x. 
46.  Tolson D, Morley JE. Physical Restraints: Abusive and Harmful. J Am Med Dir Assoc. 
2012;13(4):311-313. doi:10.1016/j.jamda.2012.02.004. 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 23 
47.  Jones C, Bäckman C, Capuzzo M, Flaatten H, Rylander C, Griffiths RD. Precipitants of 
post-traumatic stress disorder following intensive care: A hypothesis generating study of 
diversity in care. Intensive Care Med. 2007;33(6):978-985. doi:10.1007/s00134-007-
0600-8. 
48.  Mathisen L, Martin B. Use of physical restraints in adult critical care: a bicultural study. 
Am J Crit Care. 2005;14(2). 
49.  Davydow D, Gifford J. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in General Intensive Care Unit 
Survivors: A Systematic Review. Gen Hosp …. 2008;30(5):421-434. 
doi:10.1016/j.genhosppsych.2008.05.006.Posttraumatic. 
50.  Chuang Y, Huang H. Nurses’ feelings and thoughts about using physical restraints on 
hospitalized older patients. J Clin Nurs. 2007;16(3):486-494. 
51.  Hevener S, Rickabaugh B, Marsh T. Using a Decision Wheel to Reduce Use of Restraints 
in a Medical-Surgical Intensive Care Unit. Am J Crit Care. 2016;25(6):479-486. 
doi:10.4037/ajcc2016929. 
52.  Antonelli MT. Restraint management: moving from outcome to process. J Nurs Care 
Qual. 2008;23(3):227-232. doi:10.1097/01.NCQ.0000324587.53719.2f. 
53.  Johnson K, Curry V, Steubing A, et al. A non-pharmacologic approach to decrease 
restraint use. Intensive Crit Care Nurs. 2016;34:12-19. doi:10.1016/j.iccn.2015.08.004. 
54.  Cosper P, Morelock V, Provine B. Please release me restraint reduction initiative in a 
health care system. J Nurs Care Qual. 2015;30(1):16-23. 
doi:10.1097/NCQ.0000000000000074. 
55.  Mion LC, Fogel J, Sandhu S, et al. Outcomes following physical restraint reduction 
programs in two acute care hospitals. Jt Comm J Qual Improv. 2001;27(11):605-618. 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 24 
56.  Kong E-H, Song E, Evans LK. Effects of a Multicomponent Restraint Reduction Program 
for Korean Nursing Home Staff. J Nurs Scholarsh. 2017;49(3):325-335. 
doi:10.1111/jnu.12296. 
57.  Hurlock-Chorostecki C, Kielb C. Knot-So-Fast: A learning plan to minimize patient 
restraint in critical care. Can Assoc Crit Care Nurses. 2006;17(3):12-18. 
58.  Strout TD. Perspectives on the experience of being physically restrained: An integrative 
review of the qualitative literature. Int J Ment Health Nurs. 2010;19(6):416-427. 
doi:10.1111/j.1447-0349.2010.00694.x. 
59.  Jones C, Bäckman C, Capuzzo M, Flaatten H, Rylander C, Griffiths RD. Precipitants of 
post-traumatic stress disorder following intensive care: a hypothesis generating study of 
diversity in care. Intensive Care Med. 2007;33(6):978-985. doi:10.1007/s00134-007-
0600-8. 
60.  Hatchett C, Langley G, Schmollgruber S. Psychological sequelae following ICU 
admission at a level 1 academic South African hospital. South African J Crit Care. 
2010;26(2):52. doi:10.7196/sajcc.104. 
61.  De Bellis A, Mosel K, Curren D, Prendergast J, Harrington A, Muir-Cochrane E. 
Education on physical restraint reduction in dementia care: a review of the literature. 
Dementia. 2013;12(1):93-110. doi:10.1177/1471301211421858. 
62.  Enns E, Rhemtulla R, Ewa V, Fruetel K, Holroyd-Leduc JM. A controlled quality 
improvement trial to reduce the use of physical restraints in older hospitalized adults. J 
Am Geriatr Soc. 2014;62(3):541-545. doi:10.1111/jgs.12710. 
63.  Cosper P, Morelock V, Provine B. Please release me: restraint reduction initiative in a 
health care system. J Nurs Care Qual. 2015;30(1):16-23. 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in CHEST 
 25 
doi:10.1097/NCQ.0000000000000074. 
64.  Chang L-C, Liu P-F, Huang Y-L, Yang S-S, Chang W-Y. Risk factors associated with 
unplanned endotracheal self-extubation of hospitalized intubated patients: a 3-year 
retrospective case-control study. Appl Nurs Res. 2011;24(3):188-192. 
doi:10.1016/j.apnr.2009.09.002. 
65.  Lane E, Kuzow H, Manguera A, Perry R, Mansour M. 1142:  Mitts before wrists: safety 
mitts reduce restraint usage and can decrease unplanned self-extubations. Crit Care Med. 
2016;44(12). 
https://journals.lww.com/ccmjournal/Fulltext/2016/12001/1142___MITTS_BEFORE_W
RISTS_SAFETY_MITTS_REDUCE.1102.aspx. 
 
 
 
